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NEW CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION
Jean T. McKelvey
"Today we face developments in practically every aspect of our 
lives portending changes within the next quarter century as great 
as any we have experienced."^ Changes in one's own field, as in 
society in general, are often imperceptible at the time they are 
occurring. Yet, in looking back over my thirty years of teaching 
in the field of arbitration, I am struck not only by the major 
changes which have affected the concepts and practice of arbitration, 
but also, and more significantly, by the new challenges which are 
emerging to the whole profession of arbitration as well as to the 
continued viability of the institution itself.
The founders of our profession--such men (and I use the term 
"men" advisedly) as George Taylor, William Leiserson, and Harry 
Shulman--constantly pointed out that private contract and custom 
rather than statutes and court decisions had shaped the principal 
features of arbitration. The function of the arbitrator was that 
of a private judge interpreting the collective agreement and 
practices of the parties. Voluntarism, not compulsion, was the 
hallmark of the process. As Shulman stated in his classic Oliver 
Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School on February 9, 1955:
A proper conception of the arbitrator's 
function is basic. He is not a public tribunal 
imposed upon the parties by superior authority 
which the parties are obliged to accept. He 
has no general charter to administer justice 
for a community which transcends the parties.
He is rather part of a system of self-government 
created by and confined to the parties. He 
serves their pleasure only, to administer the
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rule of law established by their collective 
agreement. They are entitled to demand that, 
at least on balance, his performance be 
satisfactory to them, and they can readily 
dispense with him if it is not.2
The virtually universal acceptance of these precepts concerning 
the autonomous and consensual nature of the arbitration process left 
little room for debate or controversy. Yet, controversy did 
occur--on one point in particular. This was the dispute as to 
whether arbitration should be a system of adjudication or one of 
adjustment, or, to put it more simply, should the arbitrator 
function as a judge or as a mediator? As some of you probably recall, 
George Taylor espoused the view that the proper role of the arbitrator 
was that of a mediator, helping the parties to fill the gaps in 
their agreement, or, to change the metaphor, to graft flesh on the 
bare bones of their contract. In his view the major function of 
the arbitrator was to assist the parties in solving their own 
problems. On the other side of the argument the chief protagonist 
was Noble Braden of the American Arbitration Association who took 
the position that the arbitrator's sole role was that of a judge; 
under no circumstances was the arbitrator to act as a counselor.
Although this controversy raged with intensity (and some 
display of bad manners and lost tempers) in the 1940s and 1950s, it 
was essentially a sham debate, principally because Taylor was 
addressing himself to the functions performed by a permanent 
arbitrator, or impartial chairman, whereas Braden was concerned with 
the system of ad hoc arbitration in which the arbitrator had little 
or no familiarity with the customs and practices of the industry, 
let alone with the parties themselves.
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Other concerns of the profession at that time, as revealed in 
the early volumes of the National Academy of Arbitrators' 
Proceedings, related to the development of principles of decision 
making in the areas of management rights, discipline and discharge, 
and seniority and ability, as well as to the more pressing personal 
preoccupation of the arbitrators with their own job security, an 
issue more delicately posed by the question: "Are arbitrators 
expendable?"
A more serious threat to the profession, however, was arising 
as state courts began to stay arbitration or to set aside awards 
under either statutory or common law authority. A study by 
Professor Clyde Summers in the early fifties of some one hundred 
court cases in New York State revealed that in 60 percent of the 
decisions the judges either granted stays or modified or vacated
awards, leading Summers to query whether arbitrators were becoming
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pawns, while the judges were the true queens.
This complaint as to the inferior status of arbitrators was 
shortly to be redressed, however, starting in 1957 with the 
Lincoln Mills decision of the Supreme Court which pronounced the 
primacy of federal over state law, and followed by the Steelworkers' 
Trilogy in 1960 which exalted the skills of the arbitrator and 
cautioned the courts to refrain from intrusion into the arbitrator's 
domain. So glowing was the Court's portrait of the arbitrator's 
fine features that Robben Fleming was moved to comment that his 
colleagues would now rush out to purchase new mirrors, while 
Peter Seitz characterized the decisions as resulting in "The 
Judicial Canonization of Arbitrators."
Yet, the judicial enthronement of arbitrators did not meet 
with universal approbation, for as a number of leaders of the
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profession noted, it presaged more, rather than less, involvement 
of the judiciary with the arbitration process--a prophecy which 
time has amply fulfilled.
The Steelworkers' Trilogy, paradoxically perhaps, has continued 
to spawn an ever-increasing amount of court litigation involving the 
arbitration process. At the federal appellate court level alone, 
the most recent survey shows a 40 percent increase in reported 
litigation of arbitration cases in 1974 as compared with 1973.^
These cases fall into three broad categories: (1) conflicts between 
federal law and collective bargaining agreements; (2) judicial 
recognition of the rights of individuals to due process in 
arbitration; and (3) constitutional restraints on the arbitration 
process. All of these areas indicate the growing impact of public 
policy on the hitherto relatively private system of arbitral 
determination.
The first category--potential conflict between federal law and 
arbitration--originally was resolved by the NLRB in its Spielberg 
and its later Col Iyer decisions in favor of a policy of deferral 
to arbitration. With the recent approval of this policy by various 
federal circuit courts of appeal, it is unlikely that litigation in 
this area will increase. On the other hand, the enactment of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, especially Title VII thereof, posed a 
major challenge to the arbitration profession. At their annual 
meetings, starting in 1967, the members of the Academy began a 
running debate over their role as administrators or guardians of 
public policy. Although various suggestions were offered to work 
out a policy of accommodation where there was an irrepressible 
conflict between the agreement and the law, the dominant view seemed 
to be that the arbitrator "should respect the agreement and ignore
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the law." Whatever the divergent opinions of the members, however, 
the Supreme Court in its 1974 Gardner-Denver decision sharply jolted 
the profession when it unanimously held that the prior submission 
of an employee's claim of discrimination to arbitration did not 
foreclose that employee, whether he won or lost the arbitration, from 
seeking a trial de novo of the same claim in the federal courts.
The portrait of the arbitrator as sketched by the Court in 
Gardner-Denver was similar to the one delineated by the Court in the 
Steelworkers' Trilogy, but the features which elicited the Court's 
admiration in the Trilogy cases were the very ones which the Court 
in Gardner-Denver found unattractive for cases involving Title VII:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to 
the resolution of contractual disputes, make 
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum 
for the final resolution of rights created by 
Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the 
special role of the arbitrator, whose task is 
to effectuate the intent of the parties rather 
than the requirements of enacted legislation.
Where the collective-bargaining agreement 
conflicts with Title VII, the arbitration 
must follow the agreement. To be sure, the 
tension between contractual and statutory 
objectives may be mitigated where a collective­
bargaining agreement contains provisions 
facially similar to those of Title VII. But 
other facts may still render arbitral processes 
comparatively inferior to judicial processes 
in the protection of Title VII rights. Among 
these is the fact that the specialized competence 
of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of 
the shop, not the law of the land. [Citations 
omitted.] Parties usually choose an arbitrator 
because they trust his knowledge and judgment 
concerning the demands and norms of industrial 
relations. On the other hand, the resolution 
of statutory or constitutional issues is a 
primary responsibility of courts, and judicial 
construction has proven especially necessary
5
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with respect to Title VII, whose broad 
language frequently can be given meaning r 
only by reference to public law concepts.
Although the Gardner-Denver opinion conceded that an arbitrator's 
award might be given some, or even great, weight by the trial court, 
this concession was so guarded and so hedged about by procedural 
and substantive qualifications as to leave most arbitrators in the 
dark as to their future responsibilities and competence to decide 
Title VII issues.^
The second category of cases concerns the rights of individual 
grievants vis-a-vis one or both of the contracting parties. In 
Vaca v. Sipes the Supreme Court held that a union's failure to carry 
a case to arbitration, or to drop or settle a grievance, would 
breach its duty of fair representation if it acted in a manner that 
was "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith."
While Vaca poses more problems for the parties than for the 
arbitrators, the Second Circuit's recent decision in Holodnak v.
Avco raises a new issue of constitutional restraints on the arbitral 
process. For in Holodnak the court reversed an arbitrator's award 
upholding a discharge, on the ground that the arbitrator had ignored 
the grievant's First Amendment rights and had himself expressed 
views which were biased and prejudicial. In substance the court 
held that an arbitrator is not a mere private person, but an agent 
of government responsible for enforcing the legal and constitutional 
rights of individuals.
In addition to these major challenges to arbitration emanating 
from the judiciary, there are some other significant substantive, 
procedural, and institutional changes on the horizon.
Two instances of substantive change deserve brief mention. One 
is the recent expansion of interest arbitration, both voluntary and
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compulsory. Especially noteworthy is the growth of interest arbitration 
in the public sector, the Postal Service, and in hospital and health 
care institutions. Whether arbitrators whose major experience has 
been in grievance arbitration can develop the knowledge and expertise 
to handle interest arbitration remains to be seen. The second 
substantive change relates to new issues arising in grievance 
arbitration, such as safety, pension plans, health care, and insurance 
plans.
Procedural changes involve the expansion of expedited arbitration 
procedures in a variety of occupations, both private and public, with 
a special emphasis on short opinions and bench awards.
Finally, some marked changes are beginning to emerge in the 
arbitration establishment itself. The Academy and the designating 
agencies have worked together on a new Code of Professional 
Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management Disputes. As a 
result of a growing number of lawsuits brought against arbitrators, 
there is now some current interest in malpractice insurance for 
arbitrators. Sensitive to allegations of discrimination in its own 
ranks, the Academy has also been developing or sponsoring training 
programs to qualify more women, youth, and members of minority 
groups for admission to the profession.
In thirty years the profession of arbitration has changed 
significantly. Arbitrators are no longer supreme monarchs or 
saints. Nor are they mere "private persons" deciding only matters 
of contract interpretation. Instead, they are surrounded by constraints 
imposed by law, public policy, and affirmative action. The 
arbitrator is no longer— if he or she ever was--a heroic figure, 
but rather a humble servant laboring in the vineyards, responsible
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now to a larger public, not a private, constituency. What all these 
changes signify I have expressed earlier as follows:
As more and more contract issues--once regarded 
purely as matters of consensual law--become 
subject to overriding public regulation and 
control, the once tight little ship of private 
adjudication is indeed becoming a leaky vessel.
More and more we are witnessing challenges 
to vested institutional arrangements. Not only 
the civil rights movement but also the youth 
movement and the women's "lib" organizations are 
"pressing the industrial relations system to 
accommodate to [their] demands." If the 
institution of arbitration is to survive 
and to be "relevant" to the emerging needs 
of a new social and economic order it 
cannot afford simply to remain as a part 
of "the Establishment."
There remains the question of expertise 
or competence. Here the profession has either 
been unduly modest--or to put it more starkly 
--too specialized. Many who are experts in 
the law of the shop shy away from the notion 
of learning more about the law of the land.
But this merely means that like every 
profession, arbitrators are in need of 
continuing education. In addition to 
worrying about the training of new 
arbitrators, perhaps arbitrators should be 
concerned about retraining themselves to 
face the challenge of accommodating an old 
and valuable institution to the new movements 
for social change. In other words they 
should mind their BFOQ's!^
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